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Natural Law and Non-Aggression
Abstract. Natural law theory can render the so-called “non-aggression principle” (NAP), which prohibits the 
initiation of force against person or property, intelligible and can ground a robust, even if not exceptionless, version 
of the principle. Natural law and natural rights theories share common roots, but are often seen as divergent, if not 
antagonistic. But I believe it can plausibly be maintained that claims about natural rights ﬁ nd their home within the 
context of more comprehensive natural law theories. I seek to illustrate this claim by showing how a central claim 
about natural rights can be defended using the resources provided by the best contemporary version of natural law 
theory. I consider the signiﬁ cance of the NAP and its place in natural rights theory. I outline the contours of one 
contemporary natural law position, the new classical natural law (NCNL) theory. I go on to indicate what form I 
suspect a version of the NAP framed using the categories provided by the NCNL theory might take.
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I. Introduction
Natural law theory can render the so-called “non-aggression principle” (NAP), which 
prohibits the initiation of force against person or property, intelligible and can ground a 
robust, even if not exceptionless, version of the principle.
Natural law and natural rights theories share common roots, but are often seen as 
divergent, if not antagonistic. But I believe it can plausibly be maintained that claims about 
natural rights ﬁ nd their home within the context of more comprehensive natural law theories. 
I seek to illustrate this claim by showing how a central claim about natural rights can be 
defended using the resources provided by the best contemporary version of natural law 
theory. In Part II, I consider the signiﬁ cance of the NAP and its place in natural rights 
theory. In Part III, I outline the contours of one contemporary natural law position, the new 
classical natural law (NCNL) theory. In Part IV, I indicate what form I suspect a version of 
the NAP framed using the categories provided by the NCNL theory might take. I suggest 
that NCNL theory provides a strong foundation for absolute prohibitions on purposeful or 
instrumental attacks on people’s bodily and mental health, rooted in what is often called the 
Pauline Principle, and a sturdy but less-than-absolute basis for rights in tangible property, 
grounded in the Golden Rule. I conclude with a recap in Part V.
II. The Place of the NAP in Natural Rights Theory
An inﬂ uential strand of natural rights thinking gives pride of place, as far as political ethics 
are concerned, to the non-aggression principle. One of its most inﬂ uential advocates frames 
the principle this way: “no one may threaten or commit violence (‘aggress’) against another 
man’s person or property. Violence may be employed only against the man who commits 
such violence; that is, only defensively against the aggressive violence of another. In short, 
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no violence may be employed against a nonaggressor”.1 (For convenience, we can call the 
two aspects of the principle its person-aspect and its property-aspect.)
The principle is sometimes described as an axiom, given its arguably crucial position 
as the foundation for civilized life. A range of justiﬁ cations have been offered for it, 
however, including ones purporting to derive it from the notion of self-ownership and from 
the simple fact of the agent’s status as a living being. I want to argue here that an important 
contemporary expositions of the natural law tradition in which much natural rights thinking 
is rooted can provide limited philosophical grounding for the NAP.
Natural rights theory is characteristically concerned not with “personal morality” but 
only with “the proper sphere of ‘politics’, i.e. with violence and non-violence as modes of 
interpersonal relations.2 Talk about rights in this context is narrow: to say that a given interest 
is safeguarded by a right is to say that that interest may not be “interfered with by violence”; 
it is not at all to deny that there may be “immoral ways of exercising that right”. Whether 
there are is a question for ethics, not for political philosophy–the subset of ethics concerned 
speciﬁ cally with the just use of force.3 Natural rights theory is thus not a general theory of 
ethics: serious moral inquiry extends well beyond questions about when force might be 
appropriate. However, natural law theorists may be inclined to argue, it is most important to 
get clear on the moral limits of violence. As long as rejecting aggression is accepted as a 
ground-rule, people can get along satisfactorily even if their views on other moral questions 
differ. This does not, of course, imply that all moral stances compatible with a commitment 
to the NAP are, for natural rights theorists, equally appropriate.4 Talk about natural rights, 
rooted in the natural law tradition, is plausibly understood as a subset of natural law ethics 
more broadly construed. Natural law political ethics cannot reasonably be seen as free-
standing; rather, natural law convictions about proper limits on the use of force are intelligible 
to the extent that they ﬂ ow from natural law ethics more generally. This way of thinking 
about the relationship between political ethics and general ethics does not follow strictly, of 
course; perhaps there are moral principles that are concerned exclusively with the use of 
force and don not depend on more general principles. But it seems more economical and 
elegant to suppose that, if there are more general natural law principles of ethics, principles 
of political ethics make sense in light of those more general principles.
There are obviously multiple strands in the natural law tradition. The Spanish Scho-
lastics, for instance, have been seen as in many ways the precursors of contemporary natural 
rights theorists. But their thought, of course, was grounded in the earlier work of Aquinas 
and Aristotle. And subsequent descendants of Aquinas have reworked the Aristotelian 
tradition to which he was a major contributor in ways quite different from those of the 
Spanish (and other) Scholastics.
The position of the contemporary “new classical natural law” (NCNL) theorists is an 
obvious example. It reﬂ ects the inﬂ uence of the post-World War II analytic tradition in 
1 Rothbard, M. N.: War, Peace, and the State. In: Hoppe, H.-H. (ed.): The Myth of National 
Defense: Essays on the Theory and History of Security Production. Auburn (AL), 2003, 66. 
2 Rothbard, M. N.: The Ethics of Liberty. Atlantic Heights (NJ), 1982, 25.
3 Ibid. 24.
4 Johnson, Ch. W.: Liberty, Equality, Solidarity: Toward a Dialectical Anarchism. In: Long, R. 
T.−Machan, T. (eds): Anarchism/Minarchism: Is a Government Part of a Free Country? Aldershot, 
2008, 155–188.
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English-language philosophy, and is particularly dependent on the work of the late G. E. M. 
Anscombe. I believe a plausible version of NCNL theory can provide a version of the NAP 
with both intelligibility and justiﬁ cation.
III. The Contours of the New Classical Natural Law Theory
A. Introduction
NCNL theory features two key components: basic aspects of well being and basic practical 
principles. I consider the ﬁ rst in Section B and the second in Section C. In Section D, 
I explain why NCNL theory can regard basic moral principles as absolute while treating 
others as relative. I sum up in Section E.
B. Basic Aspects of Well Being
Basic goods, or aspects of human welfare or well being, are central to the NCNL view. 
These goods include life, speculative knowledge, practical reasonableness, friendship, 
religion, self-integration, æsthetic experience, and play.5 What matters, in general, is not 
just what counts as a basic aspect or dimension of welfare or well being. What’s signiﬁ cant, 
instead, is that these aspects of welfare are not reducible to anything else (either a substantive 
good like pleasure or felt satisfaction, or a formal good like preference-satisfaction) and 
that each category and each instance of each category is incommensurable and non-
fungible.6 An aspect of well being may be identiﬁ ed as basic in multiple ways.7 Classifying 
it this way may be the result of a process of reasoning that leading to reﬂ ective equilibrium 
among convictions including the belief that a given dimension of welfare is basic. It may 
simply be seen non-inferentially to be fundamental in nature. Denying its status as a basic 
good can be shown to be self-contradictory. A phenomenological analysis of reﬂ ection and 
choice can lead to the conclusion that a given good provides a terminus for reasoning, so 
that no further justiﬁ cation is required to pursue it. And the experience of privation or loss 
may be seen, by implication, to point to the value of what has been lost.
It is possible, the NCNL theorists emphasize, to choose among instances of various 
aspects of welfare in various combinations. And our choices are constrained by reason in 
two ways–to be reasonable, they must be for real goods rather than illusory ones (like 
emotional satisfaction untethered to objectively satisfactory states of affairs in the real 
world) and they must be consistent with the principles of practical reasonableness (about 
which more anon). But provided a choice is a choice for a real good and is otherwise 
consistent with the demands of practical reasonableness, there will be no objective way to 
rank one choice as “better” or “worse” than another (except in terms of the actor’s own 
prior commitments).
5 Some heterodox NCNL thinkers have been inclined to include more subjective aspects of 
welfare, like sensory pleasure and peace of mind on the list see Murphy, M. C.: Natural Law and 
Practical Rationality. Cambridge, 1999; Chartier, G.: Economic Justice and Natural Law. Cambridge, 
2009; and there may be good reason not to include self-integration (Chartier 2007). The details are not 
crucial.
6 Finnis, J.: Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford, 1980; Finnis, J.: Fundamentals of Ethics. 
Oxford, 1986.
7 Chartier: op. cit.
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This basic fact of incommensurability and non-fungibility renders consequentialism a 
non-starter. For standard consequentialism, at least, depends on the ability to rank-order 
states of affairs incorporating many different aspects of welfare. And if there is no rationally 
inescapable way to combine all of the goods realized in a given state of affairs–as one 
cannot if the assignment of weights to different instances of different goods must be a 
matter of choice rather than of rational necessity–then there will be, can be, no objectively 
required ranking of states of affairs in the standard consequentialism demands. (Classical 
utilitarianism offers the possibility of objective ranking by focusing on the amount of 
pleasure embodied each possibility to be ranked; but as early as Mill it was becoming 
apparent that this sort of Benthamite project was inattentive to crucial aspects of the human 
experiences of valuation and moral judgment.)
C. Practical Principles
NCNL theory maintains that reasonable participation in basic aspects of well being is 
participation governed by a set of practical principles. Two of these principles, the Golden 
Rule and the Pauline Principle, provide the basis for a version of the NAP grounded in 
NCNL theory.
1. The Golden Rule
The Golden Rule requires that one treat those affected by one’s actions fairly. It can be 
variously formulated, of course. NCNL theory characteristically emphasizes two features. 
First, if one treats two moral subjects differently, one should do so only for the purpose of 
participating, or fostering someone else’s participation, in a genuine aspect of well being. 
(Thus, one may reasonably pick capable players for a football team in order to foster the 
good of play; one may reasonably select good art over trash in order to foster the good of 
æsthetic experience; friendship requires distinctions between friends and non-friends.) 
Second, one should not treat another moral subject–even when in otherwise reasonable 
pursuit of an intelligible aspect of welfare–in a way such that one would be resentful if one 
were treated that way oneself.
2. The Pauline Principle
The Pauline Principle as understood by NCNL theorists is grounded in the incommensurability 
of basic aspects of well being. The expression “Pauline Principle” reﬂ ects St. Paul’s 
exasperated rejection8 of the notion that we might reasonably do evil to bring about good. 
The twist in the NCNL version of this principle, though, is that the principle is not seen as 
dependent on previously speciﬁ ed deontic norms.
The idea behind the principle is often cashed in something like this way: a set of rules 
(say, the Ten Commandments) is treated as given; and the Pauline Principle is understood 
as stipulating that the rules should be treated as exceptionless, so that they may not be 
violated even in pursuit of particularly good consequences. Framed this way, the principle 
appears unavoidably arbitrary. Why should I accept the relevant moral rules in the ﬁ rst 
place? And what reason, exactly, does the Pauline Principle give me to treat them as 
exceptionless? Thus, the strength of the NCNL version. The NCNL theorists do not offer a 
version of the Pauline Principle that begins with a set of speciﬁ c moral rules treated as 
8 Romans Chapter 3 Verse 8.
83NATURAL LAW AND NON-AGGRESSION
givens. Rather, they derive it in large part simply from the idea that there are objective 
aspects of human welfare. The NCNL version of the Principle can be framed like this: do 
not purposefully or instrumentally cause harm to any basic aspect of a moral subject’s 
welfare.  
Now, consider someone contemplating an attack on someone else’s welfare. If her 
action is to be reasonable, she will need to act in order to participate in some aspect of well 
being or in order to foster someone else’s participation in some dimension of welfare. 
Presuming she correctly understands what she is doing as an attack on some aspect of 
someone else’s good, then she needs to see her attack as justiﬁ ed in virtue of the good she 
seeks to realize or pursue. It can not, ex hypothesi, be because the good she’s attacking is 
valueless. But the good she’s attempting to realize does not, could not, outweigh the good 
she’s attacking: it’s not commensurable with it. So any purposeful attack on an acknowledged 
basic good in the service of another acknowledged basic good will be unreasonable, because 
it will involve treating a genuine good as if it were not a genuine good, or as if it could be 
rationally subordinated to another genuine good when it can not. (The same line of argument 
fairly clearly rules out acting with hostility toward any basic aspect of well being.)
Another way the point is sometimes made by NCNL theorists is to say that attacking a 
basic good directly amounts to the choice to make being an attacker of basic goods part of 
one’s identity. Thus, Grisez9 talks about treating oneself as giver of life and death when one 
chooses to attack someone’s life.
There’s obviously more to be said about this argument, and my purpose here is not to 
spell out all of its ramiﬁ cations or to defend it against all possible objections. The point of 
this post is to talk about the degree to which the NCNL approach to natural law theory 
might be able to justify something similar to the NAP. But I wanted to outline the basis an 
NCNL theorist might offer for the Pauline Principle so it would be clear how the NCNL 
version differs from other versions of “Don’t do evil to bring about good.” No detailed 
moral principles are presupposed: all the argument needs to get off the ground is the 
recognition that certain aspects of welfare are, indeed, aspects of welfare and that they’re 
in commensurable and non-fungible.
D. Practical Principles as Absolute
The Golden Rule, the Pauline Principle, and other relevant practical principles are all, on 
the NCNL view, absolute and exceptionless. That is, there is never a time when it is 
reasonable to ignore the Golden Rule or the Pauline Principle. But there’s one fairly obvious 
difference between the two. The Pauline Principle rules out certain generically speciﬁ able 
action-types absolutely. For example: any instance of targeting non-combatants in war-time 
is fairly clearly going to be an instance of purposefully causing harm to one or more basic 
aspects of well being. So it is possible to be quite clear in general terms about various sorts 
of conduct that will always be inconsistent with the Pauline Principle. And this means, in 
turn, that someone potentially on the receiving end of such conduct will have an absolute 
right not to be subjected to the ill effects of that conduct. By contrast, while everyone has 
an absolute right not to be treated in a manner inconsistent with the Golden Rule, just what 
conduct will prove inconsistent with this prohibition on arbitrariness will vary signiﬁ cantly 
from situation to situation. (For instance: supposing that promissory obligation is rooted in 
9 Grisez, G.: Toward a Consistent Natural-Law Ethics of Killing. American Journal of 
Jurisprudence, 15 (1970), 64–96.
84 GARY CHARTIER
the Golden Rule, there will likely be no way to specify whether someone may be exempted 
from the requirement to keep a promise without a good deal of quite situation-speciﬁ c 
information.)
The Pauline Principle is quite compatible with causing unintended but foreseen harm, 
harm as an anticipated but unsought by-product or side-effect of action intended to realize 
or pursue a genuine good. (Thus, it can allow for the use of force to defend oneself or 
others: one’s purpose in this case need not be to cause harm, but simply to repel or resist an 
attack.) But the fact that the harm is not purposeful or instrumental does not mean it’s 
automatically permissible. There will be multiple constraints on bringing about unintended 
harms. But the most important will be the Golden Rule: one may not impose a risk of 
unintended but anticipated harm on someone else if one would resent the imposition of a 
similar risk, in comparable circumstances, on oneself or one’s loved ones.
E. Conclusion
Practical reasonableness, as understood by NCNL theorists, calls for consistent acknow-
ledgement of the value of all of the varied aspects of well being and of those who 
participate in them. Discerned in diverse ways, the basic aspects of welfare are objective, 
incommensurable, and non-fungible. Regard for the welfare of real people requires 
acknowledgement of the irreducible signiﬁ cance of these aspects of well being. The Pauline 
Principle precludes acting purposefully or instrumentally to harm any of these aspects of 
welfare, or out of hostility toward it; the Golden Rule requires that we treat the moral 
subjects with whom we interact fairly. Moral rules derived from the Pauline Principle are 
exceptionless; the Golden Rule itself is exceptionless, but rules derived from it will of 
necessity be more ﬂ exible and responsive to particular circumstances.
IV. Natural Law and the Property-Aspect of the NAP
A. Alternative Natural Law Grounds for Property Rights
It is clear that the Pauline Principle provides very solid grounding for the person-aspect of 
the NAP. Any purposeful or instrumental violence against a person’s body, mental health, or 
peace of mind will clearly be ruled out by the Pauline Principle; using force to defend oneself 
or others will be permissible, but imposing unreasonable risks of harm on others will not.
The NAP as standardly formulated implies that a person’s property in material realities 
external to her person should be treated as equivalent to her person, as an extension of her 
body. Just as it would be wrong to attack a person’s body, on this view, it would be equally 
wrong, and wrong for the same basic reason, to attack her property. However, the NCNL 
theorists typically demarcate body and property quite clearly. They would be inclined, 
I think, to treat regarding one’s property as an extension of oneself as an instance of 
fetishization. That does not mean, though, that they could not come to endorse something 
similar to the property-aspect of the NAP. In the remainder of Part IV, I consider three ways 
in which they might be able to do so: they could seek to show that the Golden Rule could 
justify robust property rights (Section B); they could treat property as a basic good, view 
individual pieces of property as aspects of the self, or resist interferences with property 
rights as exercises in retrospective enslavement (Section C); or while distinguishing property 
from the basic goods, they could argue that essentially any assault on property is 
simultaneously a purposeful or instrumental assault on a basic aspect of well being (Section 
D). I conclude in Section E.
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B. Property Rights and the Golden Rule
Standard NCNL theory grounds property rights primarily in the Golden Rule. It can provide 
strong support for property rights; it is not clear, though, that the Golden Rule can ground 
the full property-aspect of the NAP. Just as there’s an absolute right not to be treated in a 
manner inconsistent with the Pauline Principle, there’s also an absolute right not to be 
treated in a manner inconsistent with the Golden Rule. But what the Golden Rule requires 
will vary far more from situation to situation than what the Pauline Principle requires. Thus, 
mid-level general norms that ﬂ ow from the Golden Rule–like Keep promises or Avoid 
rudeness–may admit of a variety of exceptions. In Subsection 1, I explain the basis for such 
rights in standard NCNL theory. In Subsection 2, I outline some proposed additions to the 
typical NCNL rationales for property rights. In Subsection 3, I consider the limitations on 
Golden Rule-based property rights that would seem to ﬂ ow even from the sort of robust 
grounding for them I envision.
1. Standard NCNL Rationales for Property Rights
The NCNL theorists begin from what they see as essentially Aristotle’s point of view: 
everything in principle belongs to everyone, but there are good reasons to give responsibility 
for each thing to someone or some group of people in particular, for the beneﬁ t of all.10 
Their view, in effect, is that property rights ﬂ ow primarily from the Golden Rule. This basic 
principle of fairness, along with some contingent but persistent facts about human nature 
and the human situation, impose some limits on what might count as a just property regime. 
Finnis focuses primarily on three constraints, overlapping and mutually reinforcing 
rationales for property rights which may also be seen as justiﬁ cations for particular property 
claims (the labels are mine):
1. Incentivization: in general, a just property system will be one that facilitates people’s 
contribution to the productivity of a community’s economy through the use of 
incentives; someone can sometimes reasonably offer the fact that a property rule would 
incentivize people to engage in productive activity as a reason for others to support the 
rule and so in support of her claim to a piece of property that would be hers under the 
rule.11 
2. Stewardship: in general, a just property system will facilitate stewardship–taking 
good care of property, cultivating and developing it responsibly, and preventing it from 
falling into disrepair; someone can sometimes reasonably offer the fact that a property 
rule would likely foster the effective stewardship of property as a reason for others to 
support the rule and so in support of her claim to a piece of property that would be 
hers under the rule.12 
3. Autonomy: in general, a just property system will be one that facilitates people’s 
autonomy–their freedom to determine the contours of their own lives and major life 
choices without intrusion by others; someone can sometimes reasonably offer the fact 
that a property rule would help people to be autonomous as a reason for others to 
10 Aristotle: Politics. (Trans. Benjamin Jowett), Oxford, 1905, II. 5.
11 Finnis, J.: Natural Law and… op. cit. 170, 173; Grisez, G.: The Way of the Lord Jesus 2: 
Living a Christian Life. Steubenville, 1994, 794.
12 Ibid. 170.
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support the rule and so in support of her claim to a piece of property that would be 
hers under the rule.13 
3. Additional Considerations Supportive of Property Rights
Each of the standard NCNL rationales is plausible and persuasive, but I suggest that several 
others might also be relevant, too. Someone evaluating a given property rule in light of the 
Golden Rule could reasonably be expected to take all of these additional rationales into 
account along with those highlighted by the NCNL theorists.
1. Generosity: in general, a just property system will be one that makes it possible for 
people to be generous; someone can sometimes reasonably offer the fact that a property 
rule would enable people to be generous as a reason for others to support the rule and 
so in support of her claim to a piece of property that would be hers under the rule.14 
2. Reliability: in general, a just property system will enable people to rely on their 
expectations that otherwise just property rules will continue in force, that decisions 
made about individual claims in light of such rules will be respected, and that otherwise 
just property titles will be respected; someone can sometimes reasonably offer the fact 
that a property rule would honor people’s past expectations or enable them to depend 
on their expectations in the future as a reason for others to support the rule and so in 
support of her claim to a piece of property that would be hers under the rule.15
3. Productivity: in general, a just property system will be one that ensures that property 
is put to its most productive use; someone can sometimes reasonably offer the fact that 
a property rule would ensure that property was put to its most productive use as a 
reason for others to support the rule and so in support of her claim to a piece of property 
that would be hers under the rule.16 
4. Compensation: in general, a just property system will be one that makes it possible 
for people to receive, and likely that they will receive, compensation for the goods and 
services they provide to others; someone can sometimes reasonably offer the fact that 
a property rule would enable people to be compensated for providing goods and 
services as a reason for others to support the rule, and so in support of her claim to a 
piece of property that would be hers under the rule.17 
5. Identity: in general, a just property system will take reasonable account of people’s 
identity-constitutive attachments to pieces of property; someone can sometimes 
reasonably offer the fact that a property rule would protect people’s identity-constitutive 
attachment to pieces of property as a reason for others to support the rule, and so in 
support of her claim to a piece of property that would be hers under the rule.18 
6. Simplicity: in general, a just property system will be one that features rules that are 
simple–that are easy to formulate, articulate, learn, and apply; someone can sometimes 
reasonably offer the fact that a property rule is simple as a reason for others to support 
13 Ibid. 172; 168–169, 192, Grisez: The Way of the Lord Jesus 2… op. cit. 794–795.
14 Aristotle: op. cit. II. 5.
15 Fried, Ch.: Modern Liberty and the Limits of Government. New York, 2006, 156–160; 
Munzer, S. R.: A Theory of Property. Cambridge, 1991, 191–226. 
16 Cp. the discussion of utility and efﬁ ciency in Munzer: ibid. 191–226.
17 Ibid. 254–291.
18 Radin, M.: Reinterpreting Property. Chicago, 1994, 35–71;  Chartier: op. cit.
87NATURAL LAW AND NON-AGGRESSION
the rule, and so in support of her claim to a piece of property that would be hers under 
the rule.19 
7. Peacemaking: in general, a just property system will be one that features rules that 
minimize conﬂ ict–notably by clearly allocating responsibility for particular things to 
particular people; someone can sometimes reasonably offer the fact that a property rule 
would be conﬂ ict-minimizing as a reason for others to support the rule, and so in 
support of her claim to a piece of property that would be hers under the rule.20 
8. Coordination: in general, a just property system will be one that coordinates 
people’s interactions by making possible the aggregation of information about their 
interests and needs and the determination of appropriate production patterns and 
distribution levels for goods and services; someone can sometimes reasonably offer 
the fact that a property rule would foster this kind of coordination as a reason for 
others to support the rule, and so in support of her claim to a piece of property that 
would be hers under the rule.21 
These additional concerns (1) add to the support for a system of private property 
provided by the considerations adduced by the NCNL theorists and (2) further constrain the 
kinds of systems that could reasonably count as just.
4. Limited Implications of Golden Rule-Based Support for Property Rights
The standard natural law approach to property, grounded in the Golden Rule, can justify 
a system of private ownership safeguarded by reliable rights. The stability and 
determinateness of the system is, in general, enhanced when the multiple additional 
considerations I have identiﬁ ed as relevant are also taken into account. But the Golden 
Rule does not require that people endorse the Lockean property rules many natural rights 
proponents read into the NAP.
The Golden Rule does not leave reasonable people with a single option as regards 
property rules as regards (i) acquisition, (ii) abandonment, or (iii) the extent of control. 
(Thus, for instance, it does not seem to provide one for a deﬁ nitive basis for deciding 
between Lockean and occupancy-and-use views, and they certainly leave open, say, the 
length of time property might need to be abandoned before title might pass to a homesteader.) 
It constrains and highlights the range of considerations relevant to the deliberations of 
reasonable people seek to determine which property rules their legal system should enforce, 
but they leave open the question just what option is ﬁ nally chosen.22
19 Epstein, R.: Simple Rules for a Complex World. Cambridge (MA), 1995.
20 Hasnas, J.: Toward a Theory of Empirical Natural Rights. Social Philosophy and Policy, 22 
(2005) 1, 111–147; Shaffer, B.: Boundaries of Order. Auburn (AL), 2009; Friedman, D.: A Positive 
Account of Property Rights. Social Philosophy and Policy, 11 (1994) 2, 1–16.
21 Barnett, R.: The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law. Oxford, 1998; Friedman: 
ibid.
22 To be clear, I do not regard this as a criticism: variability in property rules seems perfectly 
reasonable to me. (i) Some empirical facts and some implications of particular ideas are unclear and 
need still to be discovered or understood more fully, and experimentation among different property 
rules, within the constraints of justice, will facilitate greater understanding. (ii) Different people’s 
personalities will obviously vary, and some people will simply be more comfortable with some rules 
than other people will be–and there seems no reason why they should not be able to proceed 
accordingly.
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In addition, whatever general rules are compatible with the Golden Rule in light of 
these considerations, these rules will not be exceptionless. To take an obvious example: 
both Aquinas and Locke explicitly acknowledged that emergencies justiﬁ ed violating 
otherwise stable, reliable property rights. Aquinas maintains that when a need is “so 
manifest and urgent, that it is evident that the present need must be remedied by whatever 
means be at hand (for instance when a person is in some imminent danger, and there is no 
other possible remedy), then it is lawful for a man to succor his own need by means of 
another’s property, by taking it either openly or secretly: nor is this properly speaking theft 
or robbery”.23 
Aquinas seems primarily to be thinking of emergency cases. But Locke, so far from 
being the exemplar of “possessive individualism” Macpherson and others claimed him to 
be, is if anything more expansive in this regard. He writes: “charity gives every man a title 
to so much out of another’s plenty, as will keep him from extreme want, where he has no 
means to subsist otherwise”.24 Locke and Aquinas both seem to see property rules as fuzzy 
in just the way one might expect them to be if they were rooted in a general principle of 
fairness like the Golden Rule.
C. Property as a Basic Good
An alternative approach to generating a version of the property-aspect of the NAP using 
natural law theory would be to argue that justly acquired property, or controlling the 
disposition of such property–we can use ownership as a useful short-hand for this 
possibility–is itself a basic aspect of well being.
This is not, of course, an approach the NCNL theorists take themselves. They clearly 
view the value of property as instrumental. They argue that “anything human persons make, 
or have, considered as distinct from persons … cannot be basic. It is always for … reasons 
which culminate within persons … that individuals and communities are concerned with 
such goods”.25 But of course they might be mistaken about this. And, of course, even if 
individual items of property are sought and held for instrumental reasons, it does not follow 
that ownership itself is instrumental. Perhaps one or more pathway to the identiﬁ cation of 
other aspects of human well being as basic might also justify characterizing ownership of 
and control over justly acquired property in this way (Subsection 1). It might also be 
possible to treat, not ownership, but actual goods made or acquired by persons as aspects of 
those persons’ selves, deserving the same sort of immunity from purposeful or instrumental 
assault as their bodies because directly or indirectly acquired through labor (Subsection 2). 
A similarly labor-related approach might frame justify absolute property rights by 
framing interference with someone’s property as a kind of retrospective enslavement 
(Subsection 3).
1. Ownership as a Basic Good
i) Reﬂ ective Equilibrium. One might simply seek to ascertain whether afﬁ rming the good of 
ownership can be grounded in the attempt to achieve reﬂ ective equilibrium among one’s 
23 Aquinas, St. Th.: Summa Theologica. (Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province), 
London, 1920, II–II q. 94 a. 7c.
24 Locke, J.: Two Treatises of Government. London, 1689. ch. IV, § 42.
25 Finnis, J.–Boyle, J.–Grisez, G.: Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism. Oxford, 
1987, 178. 
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considered judgments about basic aspects of well being.26 It seems to me that recognition of 
ownership rights of some sort will form part of a system of beliefs in reﬂ ective equilibrium, 
but it is unclear to me that a reﬂ ective equilibrium-based approach would be sufﬁ cient to 
justify the claim that ownership was a basic good.
ii) Non-Inferential Discernment. Perhaps we might directly, non-inferentially see that 
ownership was a basic good.27 I suspect that many people have, indeed, understood 
themselves to see this: but note that they have not seen the same thing. While cross-cultural 
support for the identiﬁ cation of something as a basic good is a pointer to–not a demonstration 
of–its status,28 cultural variation in this area is enormous. Some control over resources has 
been seen as crucial, but whether that control has been individual or collective, how far it 
has extended, and how it has been established have been viewed quite differently. It does 
not seem, then, that this sort of non-inferential discernment would yield and understanding 
of ownership as a basic aspect of well being that would undergird property rights any more 
robust than those grounded in the Golden Rule.
iii) Undeniability or Self-Evidence. We might attempt to determine whether the good 
of ownership is undeniable or self-evident.29 However, even if it really were undeniable that 
assuming some kind of control over the natural environment was reasonable, it would not 
follow that Lockean rules were. And there is really no plausible claim that denying the 
value of ownership, much less Lockean ownership, is self-refuting. I suspect that a 
sufﬁ ciently clever dialectician30  could produce an argument designed to show that assertion 
presupposes the value of autonomy and that this value cannot be afﬁ rmed or preserved 
without property rights of some kind, but I am not clear that any very speciﬁ c theory could 
be generated in this way.31 
iv) Reﬂ ection on the Deliberative Process. Alternatively, we might seek to determine 
whether we in fact treat ownership as a reason-terminator, whether we regard acquiring or 
maintaining ownership as itself an exhaustive explanation of or justiﬁ cation for an action.32 
But there is little reason to think that we do reason this way. We acquire property because it 
is beautiful, because it will provide space for a family to ﬂ ourish–because it will enable us 
to achieve other goals. Even if we do not know just what we will want to do with money we 
acquire, we understand that we acquire it to achieve other ends. We can and do explain our 
acquisition of particular items of property in terms of the value of intrinsically valuable 
dimensions of fulﬁ llment in which we will or might participate. 
But though owning particular items is instrumentally valuable, it may be that we value 
ownership itself–control over aspects of the non-sentient world that have come legitimately 
to be ours. That is because we extend ourselves into the physical world when we own 
things: property rights would seem to be constitutive components of personal autonomy. 
26 Rawls, J.: A Theory of Justice. Rev. ed. Cambridge (MA), 1999, 18–19, 42–46; Larmore, Ch.: 
The Morals of Modernity. Cambridge, 1996,  55–64; McNaughton, D.: Moral Vision: An Introduction 
to Ethics. Oxford, 1988, 102–103.
27 See Gomez-Lobo, A.: Morality and the Human Goods: An Introduction to Natural Law 
Ethics. Washington (DC), 2002, 9–10; Finnis: Fundamentals of Ethics. op. cit. 51.
28 Finnis: Natural Law and… op. cit. 83–85, 97.
29 Chappell, T.: Understanding Human Goods. Edinburgh, 1998, 36.
30 Hoppe, H.-H.: The Economics and Ethics of Private Property. Auburn (AL), 2006.
31 Friedman n.d.
32 Finnis: Fundamentals of Ethics. op. cit. 51–52; Finnis: Natural Law and… op. cit. 51–99; 
Chappell: op. cit. 35.
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It remains an open question, however, whether recognizing that they are is sufﬁ cient to 
generate a scheme of property rights any sturdier than those supported by the Golden Rule.
v) Privation. Perhaps it is. We can see why it might be by means of an approach to the 
status of ownership as a basic good by way of privation.33 The general idea, for natural law 
theorists, is that a basic good is what has been damaged any time we can agree that someone 
has suffered a genuine harm or loss. Certainly, when something has been stolen from me, 
I am inclined to see the wrong done not only as instrumental–so that theft, say, is 
objectionable just because it keeps me from enjoying some future beneﬁ t–but also as a 
violation of a protected sphere of my existence. Taking something that is mine is, apart 
from its obvious instrumental undesirability, itself a violation. And it is easy to characterize 
what has been harmed as something like the good of ownership.
We ordinarily pursue the ownership of particular things as an instrumental rather than 
as an intrinsic good, and I think we would be inclined to regard the pursuit individual 
objects, or of material wealth more broadly, as fetishistic unless undertaken for some ulterior 
purpose (we might be inclined to regard the attempt to obtain or retain ownership of 
a speciﬁ c identity-constitutive piece of property, understood as inherently valuable, as a 
different matter). This is clearly the way the NCNL theorists view political liberty: they 
argue that “[p]eople want liberty in order to pursue the truth, to worship as they think right, 
to participate in the responsible play of political decision-making, to live in friendship, and 
so on”.34 If property only mattered instrumentally, as the NCNL theorists believe liberty 
matters, then, of course, it could not reasonably be regarded as a basic aspect of well 
being.
I suspect, in fact, that people often seek liberty because they do not wish to be 
dominated, subordinated, pushed around–that they value liberty for its own sake. Similarly, 
we do seem sometimes to regard an attack on ownership as a harm in its own right, apart 
from any particular property loss resulting from the attack. Our concern in these cases may 
be seen as with the attacker’s attitude–her disrespect for our ownership–as well as with her 
violation of our autonomy and our related right to control our property.
It is important not to let the approach from privation prove too much. After all, thieves 
with no claim at all to property they have stolen may be angrily resentful when it is 
reclaimed–even  by the rightful owners. While the recognition of harm in the case of theft 
does highlight something of moral importance, it is crucial to build into any account of 
ownership as a basic good the requirement that the ownership that is a basic good be 
ownership of justly acquired property. That this is so highlights the dependence of any 
credible account of ownership as a basic good on independently speciﬁ ed rules governing 
the acquisition, retention, and extent of property rights.
vi) The Limited Implications of Conceiving of Ownership as a Basic Good. Reﬂ ective 
equilibrium might provide some general support for the value of ownership, but certainly 
quite little support for treating it as an intrinsic good. There is little reason to think that 
Lockean property rights can be seen to be self-evident or undeniable–or even just non-
inferentially evident. Asking whether ownership of some particular thing serves as the 
terminus in a plausible chain of practical reasoning seems to lead to a negative answer; but 
ownership itself seems a more likely candidate for status as a basic good. And the approach 
33 Grisez, G.: The Way of the Lord Jesus 1: Christian Moral Principles. Chicago, 1983, 123; 
Murphy: op. cit. 40.
34 Finnis–Boyle–Grisez: op. cit. 278.
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by way of privation also suggests that we may see, at least, control over what is already 
legitimately ours as a basic value.
But even if there might be some limited reason to think of ownership as a basic good, 
many infringements on someone’s property cannot plausibly be understood as purposeful or 
instrumental attacks on that person’s right to own. Theft will be, since the thief’s project 
can succeed only if she is the owner of a piece of property and the prior owner is not. There 
is no way to understand theft except as an attack on the ownership of the existing owner. 
But other actions which cause harm to property and may impede the owner’s control over 
her property may be incidental rather than purposeful or instrumental, and so will potentially 
be justiﬁ able in terms of the more permissive Golden Rule.
The fundamental problem, in any case, is that acknowledging the intrinsic value of 
ownership would not answer the question of what scheme or schemes of ownership rights 
are just. Treating ownership as intrinsically valuable does provide a strong moral argument 
against theft, once property rights are deﬁ ned. But it provides no particular basis for deﬁ ning 
just what rights ought to be secure against theft and how these rights ought to be acquired. 
If the deﬁ nition of property rights–including both their acquisition and their extent–is 
primarily dependent on the Golden Rule, the case, the actual contours of property rights 
will be little different from what they would be if they had been deﬁ ned in light of the 
Golden Rule without any reference to a basic good of ownership. If the Golden Rule, for 
instance, were understood to underwrite Aquinas/Locke-style exceptions to general property 
rules in the context of a system deﬁ ned exclusively by the Golden Rule, it is not clear why 
it would not similarly be understood to do so if a good of ownership were acknowledged. 
It’s just that, in this latter case, while theft would clearly be out of moral bounds, the Golden 
Rule would ground a prior deﬁ nition of the boundaries theft would be seen as trespassing in 
such a way that those boundaries would not be understood to be violated by someone taking 
another’s property in an Aquinas/Locke-style case.
2. Property as an Aspect of Identity
Alternatively, a natural rights theorists working within the constraints of NCNL theory 
might argue, not that ownership was a basic good, but rather that individual items of justly 
acquired property should be treated as aspects of the self, so that an attack on a person’s 
justly acquired property was morally objectionable for the same reasons as an attack on her 
body. On this sort of view, property might be acquired justly either in virtue of the labor of 
the person acquiring it (who has either directly created it using unowned materials, claimed 
it from among unowned resources, or acquired it using resources gained in exchange for her 
labor or other justly acquired property) or, if it is a gift, in virtue of the labor of the person 
giving it to her. In virtue of this labor, the property would be understood to be incorporated 
into the identity of the person acquiring it.
On this view, the things people make or have really are aspects of those who make or 
have them. The labor involved in making or acquiring property would be what justiﬁ ed 
treating the property as an aspect of the self. And it would simultaneously provide a non-
arbitrary basis for deﬁ ning the limits of property distinct from general considerations rooted 
in the Golden Rule.
The NCNL theorists argue, recall, that “anything human persons make, or have, 
considered as distinct from persons ... cannot be basic. It is always for ... reasons which 
culminate within persons ... that individuals and communities are concerned with such 
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goods”.35 But this cannot be entirely correct, even from the standpoint of the NCNL theorists 
themselves. Consider a prosthesis, for instance–made by persons and attached to a person’s 
body. While the prosthesis is an artifact, an attack on it seems to be invasive, an assault on 
well being, for the same reasons as an attack on a healthy leg. It does not seem reasonable 
to regard the prosthesis “as distinct from” the person who employs it.
The NCNL theorists might argue, in response, that the prosthesis was no longer distinct 
from the person employing it once it was attached to her body. But what kind of attachment 
is required? Does an artiﬁ cial leg that is attached by straps count as distinct from its owner, 
while one that is attached surgically does not? A focus on the mode of attachment seems 
arbitrary. It is easy enough to imagine an entirely artiﬁ cial body that is physically distant 
from a human brain but which is fully controlled by the brain, say, via radio transmission, 
and which provides a full range of sensory inputs to the brain in the same way. Despite the 
lack of direct physical connection, it could certainly be argued that body was not distinct 
from the person controlling it. It seems, in short, as if the extent of control over an item, 
rather than the precise physical relationship between the item and the person’s brain, might 
be decisive for the question whether the item was or was not distinct from its owner.
Even this cannot be quite right, of course, because a person whose body was completely 
paralyzed, and who thus had no control over it at all, might well regard it, almost certainly 
would regard it, as an integral aspect of herself. Perhaps, then, whether something counts as 
distinct from a person or not might be understood to be in part of a function of how she 
understood it.
It is clear that this criterion cannot reasonably be employed by the law or by a general 
system of social norms or rules, however, since how people regard things will vary quite 
dramatically from person to person. The law could certainly establish a limited number of 
presumptions concerned with familiar, predictable cases–so that, for instance, a person’s 
paralyzed body might be expected to be identity-constitutive for the person, and a home 
that had been owned by successive members of a given family for generations might be 
expected to be identity-constitutive for members of the family. In general, however, the 
identity-constitutive character of a piece of property can only be introduced into a legal 
dispute at the cost of considerable confusion. The extent of a person’s control over something 
is, by contrast, relatively easy to ascertain.
If the extent of control is used, however, to determine whether the property control is 
distinct from the owner, it is clear that very few items of property–essentially only the 
person possesses and controls bodily on a consistent basis–might have any reasonable 
chance of being seen as not distinct from their owners. The labor involved in the production 
and acquisition of the property would not seem to be sufﬁ cient on its own to justify treating 
the property as incorporated into the owner’s identity: the property can be distinguished 
from the owner.
3. Interference with Property as Retrospective Enslavement
A related approach might seek to bridge the gap between person and property by arguing 
that interfering with someone’s justly acquired property was tantamount to enslaving her. 
This view would begin, again, with the claim that justly acquired property was property 
acquired directly or indirectly or indirectly through labor. To use force to compel someone to 
labor is to enslave her. But to use force to acquire what she has already labored to produce or 
35 Finnis–Boyle–Grisez: op. cit. 178.
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acquire seems morally similar to using force to make her labor to produce or acquire it in the 
ﬁ rst place. But if the former is enslavement, then the latter arguably is as well. If enslavement 
is unjust, then using force to acquire someone’s property is unjust. Slavery is generally 
regarded as a paradigmatic instance of injustice. So it seems to follow that partially or 
completing depriving someone of her justly acquired property by force is unjust.
Whether this intuitively plausible argument can be persuasively defended using NCNL 
theory depends, of course, on how NCNL theory understands the wrongness of slavery. 
NCNL theory begins with a conviction that persons are morally equal, and that there is thus 
no “natural right to rule”.36 There cannot, therefore, be any permanent classes of slaves or 
slave-owners. Similarly, one cannot reasonably attack another’s physical or mental health in 
order to realize the goods achievable through her labor as a slave: to do so would be to 
violate the Pauline Principle by causing harm instrumentally. And even if retributive 
punishment is justiﬁ ed (as I maintain that it is not), punishing someone for failing to labor 
as a slave will obviously be justiﬁ ed only if one may justly enslave her.
For the NCNL theorists, then, using bodily force to keep someone as a slave or to 
punish her for not laboring as a slave will be wrong in principle. But it will be wrong because 
it involves actual or threatened purposeful or instrumental attacks on bodily health or other 
basic aspects of well being. The aspect of enslavement that is inconsistent with the Pauline 
Principle is not, per se, the control of someone’s labor without her consent but rather the use 
of force against someone’s bodily well being in order to compel her to serve the enslaver’s 
purposes. To be sure, other techniques used to inﬂ uence slaves’ behavior will also be 
objectionable, from the standpoint of NCNL theory, because they are inconsistent with the 
Golden Rule. But interference with property after labor has already been used to acquire it, 
by contrast, will not involve attacks on basic goods. It may involve conduct inconsistent 
with the Golden Rule, of course; but whether it does will depend on just what kinds of 
property rights the Golden Rule requires people to acknowledge or support. It does not seem, 
then, that the right not to be enslaved entails a right to possess labor-based property without 
interference. The argument from slavery does not provide a route within NCNL theory to an 
account of property rights rooted in something other than the Golden Rule.
4. Conclusion
If the goods of ownership were understood as involving a full array of Lockean constraints 
on the acquisition, retention, and extent of property rights, the Pauline Principle might 
generate something quite like the NAP. But it is difﬁ cult to see how the panoply of 
procedures natural law theorists employ to identify fundamental aspects of well being would 
lead to the identiﬁ cation not just of ownership, but of this sort of Lockean ownership, as a 
basic good. Labor-based approaches might be thought to provide non-arbitrary limits on the 
kind of ownership that could be seen as a basic good. But there do not seem to be good 
arguments either for treating labor-based property as incorporated into the self or for judging 
interference with rights to such property as retrospective enslavement.37
36 Finnis, J.: Aquinas. Oxford, 1998, 184–185.
37 While the understanding of interference with property rights as retrospective enslavement is 
to some degree intuitively attractive, it does have counter-intuitive implications. I would be unlikely 
to judge that your breaking into my mountain cottage to escape an avalanche was equivalent to 
enslaving me (cp. the range of cases discussed in Friedman, D.: The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to 
a Radical Capitalism. 2d ed. Chicago, 1989, 168–176). 
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D. Property Interests as Coincident with Basic Goods
Whether or not ownership is a basic aspect of well being, claims on speciﬁ c items of 
property clearly function instrumentally to foster participation in various basic goods. 
Another alternative grounding for a natural-law version of the NAP might build on this 
recognition. Someone might argue, that is, that because of this instrumental relationship, 
any attempt to damage a person’s property or deprive her of it will also, at the same time, 
be an attack on one or more basic aspects of well being and so be precluded by the Pauline 
Principle.
Clearly, people sometimes seek to participate in unreal goods using their property, or 
to participate unjustly in genuine goods. But this possibility need pose no serious threat to 
the argument linking property instrumentally with basic goods. The legal system cannot 
meaningfully distinguish between property used in pursuit of unreal goods from property 
used in pursuit of real ones. In the interests of simplicity, in recognition of the value of 
autonomous decision-making, and in full view of the legal system’s frequent and unavoidable 
ignorance of people’s purposes, it will characteristically be most reasonable for the legal 
system to operate as if people are pursuing real goods whether they are or not. The legal 
system, then, should, if this argument were correct, incorporate a straightforward prohibition 
on attacks on property, even though not all property actually functioned to facilitate 
participation in one or more basic aspects of well being.
A property right need not be entitled to full protection to the extent that it is being 
employed in pursuit even of a genuine aspect of well being but in the course of an unjust 
attack on person or property. I have no particular right to use a weapon I legitimately own 
to engage in aggression against someone else, and others may rightly interfere with my 
control over my property to stop me from doing so (as well as to require restitution, etc.).38 
The use of my property to rob another can (ordinarily) be clearly distinguished from uses of 
my property that are consistent with just property rules. So the possibility that there might 
be unjust uses of property need not make a moral or legal principle precluding all direct 
attacks on property being used justly unduly difﬁ cult to operationalize. It does, however, 
make the Golden Rule decisive, again, since without the Golden Rule (or some similar 
principle) it will be difﬁ cult to know just what uses will count as just or unjust. The 
argument does not feature any independent speciﬁ cation of just uses. Perhaps, for instance, 
any use that precludes someone else’s access in an Aquinas/Locke-style cases will count as 
an unjust use.
Suppose, however, that we could provide a reasonable independent speciﬁ cation of 
just uses which was not simply a speciﬁ cation of the Golden Rule, so that the second 
argument I have envisioned could, in principle, do some further work in addition to the 
Golden Rule in safeguarding property rights if it succeeded. We would still need to 
determine whether the argument’s premise, that purposeful or instrumental assaults on 
property rights are, at the same time, purposeful or instrumental assaults on basic goods, 
was correct. (Obviously, if they are not purposeful or instrumental, they would not fall foul 
of the Pauline Principle whether they affected basic goods or not.)
While there are many cases in which assaults on property will be assaults on basic 
goods (an attack on a painting may be both an attack on someone’s property and an attack 
38 That others have the right to restrain me does not imply that they also have the right to 
permanently deprive me of the property I am using unjustly. Thanks to Roman Pearah for emphasizing 
the need to clarify this point.
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on the basic good of æsthetic experience) it is hard to see that this will be true in every case. 
Using a computer to embezzle money from someone’s bank account could be an attack on 
some basic good if its purpose was to keep someone from participating in that good (the 
thief might want the victim not to be able to pay medical bills and so to die; this would 
surely count as an attack on the good of life and bodily well being), but harm to a basic 
good might well be neither the thief’s purpose nor an accepted means to some other end 
embraced by the thief. And it would be easy to identify a range of other cases in which an 
attack on someone’s property did not count as an attack on any basic aspect of well being.
E. Conclusion
A set of mutually reinforcing, overlapping rationales rooted in the Golden Rule can ground 
robust individual property rights that deserve acknowledgement within legal systems and 
respect by individual moral actors. Such rationales will not, however, be absolute in 
character. Property rights rooted in the Golden Rule will almost certainly not be as 
sacrosanct as rights against purposeful or instrumental attacks on basic aspects of one’s 
well being. Assaults on the latter are ruled out absolutely by the Pauline Principle; 
interference with the former will often be unjust, but need not always be.
Alternate approaches to grounding property rights that are as robust as rights against, 
say, purposeful bodily harm are hard to defend within the terms of NCNL theory. Ownership 
might qualify as a basic good, but its boundaries are relatively undeﬁ ned. A limited number 
of items of property distinct from persons might be viewed as aspects of those persons’ 
identities comparable to their bodies, and so subject to the same protections, but most items 
of property, even if clearly rooted in labor, are clearly distinct from their owners. Interfering 
with labor-based property after it is acquired is importantly different from compelling 
people to labor to acquire it, and so does not seem to fall foul of the moral prohibitions that 
preclude enslavement. And assaults on property need not involve purposeful or instrumental 
attacks on basic aspects of well being recognized as such by the NCNL theorists. An account 
of property rights consistent with NCNL theory will likely be rooted in the Golden Rule.
V. Conclusion
The NCNL theory gives pride of place to an account of human ﬂ ourishing and a set of basic 
practical principles. It provides a straightforward grounding for the person-aspect of the 
NAP and, through a more tortuous path, strong support for a robust but non-absolute version 
of the property-aspect of the NAP.
1. The basic fairness considerations embodied in the Golden Rule will count against 
the cost shifting represented by many of the property regulations the NAP is rightly 
seen as attacking. Most people will resent being asked to pay for the realization of 
other people’s æsthetic, religious, or cultural preferences or to pay for services they 
could obtain more inexpensively on the market; and, if they do, they will act 
unreasonably if they ask other people to do so. More generally, whatever judgments 
people tend to make about their own property rights will be judgments fairness will 
demand that they accept when reaching conclusions about others’.
2. Our participation in basic goods will characteristically involve the use of property. 
Attacks on someone’s property will sometimes be ruled out precisely because they are 
also purposeful or instrumental attacks on basic goods.
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3. Similarly, people often protect their property using their bodies, and attacks on their 
property will thus sometimes be inappropriate precisely because it involves using force 
purposefully or instrumentally in ways that harm people’s bodies.
4. Acting out of hostility toward someone by harming her or his property will always 
be consistent with the Pauline Principle.
5. The overlapping considerations I have adduced in support of a property rights 
regime tend to provide mutually reinforcing, and so quite robust, justiﬁ cation for 
largely undisturbed property rights. 
6. The NCNL theorists offer a set of rock-solid arguments against classical 
utilitarianism and its various consequentialist cousins: global consequentialism is, they 
show persuasively, incoherent.39 That does not mean, of course, that expected con-
sequences are never relevant to deliberation about reasonable action; but their 
reasonableness is to be gauged in light of the Golden Rule rather than in terms of 
a putatively objective metric that allows a “best overall state of affairs” to be identiﬁ ed. 
Multiple options are consistent with the demands of reason. So, while pragmatic 
considerations can certainly enter into moral deliberation, global consequentialism can 
not justify any sort of attack on someone’s person, and can not be invoked in support 
of any infringement of someone’s property rights.
A version of the NAP that can be defended on natural-law grounds–with the person-aspect 
rooted in the Pauline Principle and the property-aspect rooted in the Golden Rule–may not 
feature all of the elements preferred by some natural rights theorists, but it can provide 
moral grounding for the security of both persons and property. Instead of proceeding from a 
simple, free-standing, substantive value–self-ownership or life, for instance–a natural-law 
approach to the NAP renders this principle intelligible and defensible in light of a 
comprehensive moral theory. In so doing, it can make a modest contribution to justifying 
a norm that is basic to all civilized interaction and so, perhaps, to fostering the creation of 
a society in which that norm is more consistently observed.
39 Grisez, G.: Against Consequentialism. American Journal of Jurisprudence, 23 (1978), 21–
72.; Finnis–Boyle–Grisez: op. cit. 254–260.
